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Abstract 
Over a decade removed from devastating civil wars in Liberia (2003) and Sierra Leone (2002), both 
states have unsurprisingly placed a strong emphasis on post-conflict economic development. Despite 
a streak of impressive GDP growth in both states, a host of underlying structural deficiencies are 
readily apparent. Long-term natural resource reliance subjects both economies to the boom and bust 
cycle of global commodity markets while simultaneously encouraging rent-seeking behavior. More 
specifically, Liberia’s growing iron ore sector and Sierra Leone’s diamond exports have generated 
pockets of wealth, though the profits have not trickled down to the public at-large. The purpose of 
this paper is two-fold. I first explore how two very similar countries have approached post-conflict 
development. Secondly, I analyze the opportunities and obstacles to sustainable economic develop-
ment in both states. The preliminary evidence presented in this paper suggests that Liberia’s pursuit 
of good governance policies through the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Pro-
gram (GEMAP) places it in a relatively better position to attract both foreign direct investment and 
bilateral aid in the coming years. Conversely, Sierra Leone’s unwillingness to seriously combat institu-
tional corruption will likely serve as an impediment to stable economic development. While develop-
ment in both states could very well be mitigated by a host of exogenous factors (environmental catas-
trophe, conflict-spillover, disease), this paper advances the argument that good governance and eco-
nomic diversification must remain top priorities.  
Keywords: Liberia, Sierra Leone, post-conflict development, sustainable development 
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Introduction 
The similarities between Liberia and Sierra Leone are striking. As neighboring states in 
West Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone feature geographic, climatological, and natural resource 
commonalities. This of course, has a profound impact on the opportunities for economic devel-
opment in both states. Historically, Liberia was established as a haven for freed American slaves 
in 1824, with a formal declaration of independence in 1847. As a result, it became the first inde-
pendent state in Africa. Though Liberia was never formally colonized by a European power, a 
powerful argument can be made that the native population underwent de-facto colonization. Ac-
cording to Sessay, Ukeje, Gbla and Ismail (2009), “The Americo-Liberians, who constituted only 
five percent of the population, controlled every facet of life in Liberia until 1980.”(p. 71). As a 
distinct social class, Americo-Liberians dominated the political and economic landscape through 
the True Whig Party. The Liberian state’s marginalization of the majority indigenous population 
had profound political consequences, culminating in Sergeant Samuel Doe’s 1980 military coup. 
Sierra Leone was also established as a refuge for former slaves. In 1787, the capital, Free-
town, was founded to accommodate freed slaves living in the United Kingdom and Canada. Sier-
ra Leone eventually became a British Protectorate and did not declare its independence until 
1961. Much like Liberia, Sierra Leone’s freed slave population constituted an elite economic 
group. Sessay et al (2009) write, “Due to early exposure to European culture and education, the 
Creoles, a minority, dominated the professions, including law, medicine, teaching, and the civil 
service” (p. 19). Unlike the Americo-Liberian elite, Sierra Leone’s Creoles kept their distance 
from political participation until dictator Siaka Stevens took power in 1968.  
  Volumes have been written on the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Therefore, the 
purpose of this section is simply to provide an overview of the two wars and the associated impli-
cations for post-conflict economic development1. Under Samuel Doe’s military rule, Liberia’s 
indigenous community had hoped that the new government would correct the abuses committed 
by over one hundred years of Americo-Liberian rule. Instead, it became clear that Doe was more 
concerned with consolidating his own control over the country’s rubber, timber, and mining re-
sources. In 1985, Doe refused to step down after losing the presidential elections, creating popu-
lar unrest and tension within his government. Four years later, Charles Taylor, a former cabinet  
1For a more detailed account of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone please see, Gberia, L. (2005). A Dirty 
War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 
Moran, Mary H. 2006. Liberia: The Violence of Democracy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
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member, launched an invasion from the Liberian-Cote D’Ivoire border. What followed was a 
fourteen year civil war, infamous for its brutality toward the civilian population. John Ohiohenu-
an (2009) writes, “By the time a cease-fire was reached in 2003, the country had experienced eco-
nomic regression, severely deteriorated infrastructure, social decay, disintegrated institutions, and 
corroded governance procedures” (p. 121).  
The seeds for Sierra Leone’s civil war were planted by the single-party rule of Siaka Ste-
vens and his All People’s Congress (APC). Like Doe, Stevens’ rule was characterized by neo-
patrimonial policies.  Fredline M’ Cormack-Hale (2010) writes, “Prior to 1991, Sierra Leone was 
ravaged by wide-scale corruption and inefficiency, with weak infrastructure, crippling debts, and 
poor economic infrastructure” (p. 97).  Politically, Stevens introduced a single party constitution 
in 1978 bequeathing him with the title of “President for Life” (Sessay et al. 2009).  The 1978 con-
stitution effectively banned political opposition and contributed to an even greater centralization 
of executive power. Stevens finally left office in 1985 after 18 years in rule, and turned over the 
presidency to his hand-picked successor Joseph Saidu Momoh, former Commander of the 
Armed Forces (Sessay et al, 2009, p. 33). Momoh proved to be as incompetent as his predecessor, 
and was eventually chased from power in 1992. Political repression combined with flagrant eco-
nomic mismanagement created favorable conditions for the germination of rebel groups. The 
civil war in Sierra Leone, which began with an incursion by the Charles Taylor supported RUF 
rebels in 1991, came to an end with the UNAMSIL Peacekeeping intervention (1999-2002). The 
eleven year war was characterized by a series of military coups, the use of child-soldiers, and dia-
mond smuggling as a source of rebel income.  
Protracted violence coupled with gross resource mismanagement left Liberia and Sierra 
Leone in tatters. In the immediate post-war environment, the international community inter-
vened to provide basic services to the war-weary population. Meanwhile, transitional govern-
ments in Liberia and Sierra Leone were tasked with reconstructing a government bureaucracy, re-
integrating ex-combatants into society, and rebuilding political legitimacy and trust. As a measure 
of political stability has been attained over ten years after the cessation of hostilities, it now ap-
pears less likely that either state will slip back into civil war. As Paul Collier (2007) writes, “the 
experience of having been through a civil war roughly doubles the risk of another conflict. Only 
around half of the countries in which a conflict has ended manage to make it through a decade 
without relapsing into war” (p. 27).  In this respect, Liberia and Sierra Leone have been success-
ful. Yet, Collier (2007) also notes that poor, commodity-dependent countries are at a higher risk 
of getting caught in the conflict trap (p. 34).   
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Therefore, post-conflict development is important for political, economic, and security reasons. 
Through the analysis of macroeconomic data and governance reform programs the remainder of 
this paper will examine whether or not Liberia and Sierra Leone have put themselves in a favora-
ble position for future economic success.  
Literature Review 
If one were to simply examine post-war macroeconomic data from Liberia and Sierra Le-
one, it would be tempting to conclude that both states are on their way toward achieving middle-
income status. Since 2003, GDP has grown at an impressive pace in both states. The most recent 
figures from the World Bank indicate that Liberia’s GDP grew by 8.1 percent in 2013, while Sier-
ra Leone’s rose by 13 percent (World Bank, 2014). Similarly, GNI in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
increases annually, though it must be mentioned that both states still rank below the Sub-Saharan 
average (World Bank, 2014).  Despite recent economic growth, it is evident that many of the ben-
efits have not reached the general population. According to the UNDP’s Human Development 
Index (2014), which measures life expectancy, educational attainment, and income, Liberia ranks 
175th and Sierra Leone 183rd out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2014). In addition, 63.8 percent of 
Liberia’s population lives at or below the national poverty line compared with 52.9 percent in Si-
erra Leone (World Bank, 2014).  
Explaining rapid economic growth in both states is relatively simple, but understanding 
the relationship between GDP growth and widespread poverty proves to be a more complicated 
endeavor. The cessation of violent conflict and high commodity prices explain much of the mac-
roeconomic growth in Liberia and Sierra Leone over the past decade. The first explanation re-
mains controversial in the economics literature as it is harder to quantify than the simpler rela-
tionship between high commodity prices and GDP growth. Bellows and Miguel (2006) write, 
“The net long-run effects of war are ambiguous from the point of view of economic theory. To 
the extent that war impacts are limited to the destruction of capital, the neo-classical model pre-
dicts rapid economic growth postwar converging back to steady-state growth” (p. 394). Collier 
(2007) argues that while post-conflict states often experience economic growth in the first decade 
of reconstruction, due to the relative ease of instituting new reforms, sustaining these reforms 
proves to far more difficult (p.72). Despite the difficulties inherent to maintaining peace in a post
-conflict country, the economic data suggests that a positive correlation between peace and eco-
nomic growth exists. This may result from the state cutting military spending following a civil 
war, it can also be attributed to the reintegration of former combatants in the formal economy.  
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In this respect, post-conflict societies can be viewed as major opportunities for transformation 
(Collier, 2007, p.73).  
A direct relationship between high commodity prices and robust economic growth exists 
in resource-dependent states. The linkage between oil-exporting African states and economic vol-
atility have been well documented in the literature2. Yet, the problem does not seem to be that 
commodity exporting states are unaware of the potentially adverse consequences of such eco-
nomic behavior. Rather, when commodity prices are high, the government lacks incentive to pur-
sue economic diversification. For the political and economic elites in African states, rents collect-
ed from resource revenue also contribute to domestic income inequality. Joseph and Gillies 
(2009) write, “It stands to reason that if 90 percent of a country’s export earnings derive from 
petroleum, as has been the case for decades in Nigeria, Gabon, and Congo-Brazzaville, then oil 
revenues will skew the pursuit of economic advancement of much of the society unless bold 
countervailing actions are taken” (p. 257).  
With regard to Liberia and Sierra Leone, iron-ore and diamond exports have had a dis-
proportionate impact on recent economic growth. According to the African Development Bank’s 
(2013) African Economic Outlook, “the mining sector made real GDP growth leap from 6 per-
cent to 16.7 percent, with support from agriculture, services and construction” (p. 274). As for 
Liberia, “post-war economic growth was sustained in 2012 led by the first full year of iron-ore 
exports, construction, and strong performance in the service sector, but these positive trends are 
subject to fluctuations in commodity prices, FDI, and overseas development assistance” (p 242). 
Therefore, as commodity prices remain high, it is reasonable to expect corresponding GDP 
growth.  However, it must be said that both states remain on shaky economic ground. In Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, the growing service and construction sector is funded mainly through foreign 
aid. As a result, the durability of these sectors remains an open question. Currently, over 45 per-
cent of Liberia’s labor forces is employed in construction and services. What will these employees 
do if aid dries up?  
The question of aid efficacy remains a perennial source of contention among scholars3.  
 
 
 
2 See Ross, M.  (1999). The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. World Politics: 51(2) 297-322 Shaxson, N. 2005. 
New Approaches to Volatility: Dealing with the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa. International Affairs 81(2) 311-
324  
3See Moyo, D. (1999). Dead Aid: Why Aid is not working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa. USA: Farrar, Strauss, 
and Giroux. Sachs, J. (2006). The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. New York: Penguin Books.  
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Though it is well beyond the scope of this paper to engage in that particular debate, it is appro-
priate to briefly examine the aid regime in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The end of civil war brought 
with it the promise of greater international economic assistance. Along with the ubiquitous pres-
ence of non-for-profit organizations within the respective states, official donors stepped up their 
aid commitments. According to the OECD, in 2012, Liberia received $571 million dollars in Of-
ficial Development Assistance from the World Bank and IMF. In the same year, the United 
States provided Liberia with $181 million aid dollars. As a result, Liberia now receives three-times 
more ODA than the Sub-Saharan average (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment [OECD], 2014). During the same year, Sierra Leone received $443 million in ODA, with 
$87 million coming from its largest bilateral donor, Great Britain (OECD, 2014).  Sierra Leone 
has traditionally received less aid than Liberia. In both cases, the vast majority of aid money went 
to social sector support and debt management. Additionally, both states in 2006 became entitled 
to generous debt forgiveness under the World Bank/IMF HIPC initiative (World Bank, 2014).  
The combination of high commodity prices, generous foreign aid, and debt forgiveness begs the 
question of whether aid in Liberia and Sierra Leone are providing opportunities for development, 
or acting as another type of economic rent.   
A direct answer to the aforementioned question is unavailable, absent from gaining access 
to independent government audits. However, in this case, corruption indicators serve as a reason-
able proxy. According to Transparency International, Liberia improved its position on the global 
corruption index in 2013 to 83rd out of 177 countries. In contrast, Sierra Leone ranked 119th in 
the same year (Transparency International, 2013). The disparity in these cases is largely explained 
by differences in political will between the respective regimes. When Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as-
sumed office in 2006 as Liberia’s and Africa’s first female president she remarked, “The new gov-
ernment will use all conceivable legal resources to tackle corruption forcefully and effectively to 
recapture state resources for national development” (Ohiorhenuan 2009, p.121). In contrast, Ses-
say et al (2009) argue, “the undisputable reality is that Sierra Leone cannot effectively embark up-
on any credible post-war reconstruction initiatives in the absence of local capacity and resources, 
human and material”. However, “It is already obvious that local and international goodwill is pro-
gressively waning in the light of government’s inability to curb the scourge of corruption” (p. 68).  
Therefore, it becomes apparent that cracking down on corruption builds domestic and interna-
tional trust, important in the first case for political legitimacy and in the latter for future FDI and 
aid distribution.  
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African political leaders, regardless of ideology or regime-type frequently declare their 
commitment to curb domestic corruption, usually in a very public way.  Unfortunately, few lead-
ers actually follow through on their promises. In many cases, the problem can be attributed to the 
existing economic incentive structures within the state, coupled with the government’s inability to 
root out localized corruption outside of their sphere of influence. Yet, in some instances a regime 
can actually make significant progress in this challenging area of governance. From 2005-2010, 
Liberia, in cooperation with several international actors instituted the Governance and Economic 
Management Assistance Program (GEMAP)4. According to Liberia’s “Agenda for Transfor-
mation” strategy paper, the purpose of this program was to reconstitute Liberia’s economic 
framework, reform key institutions, and promote transparency and accountability (Government 
of Liberia, 2013).  The following section will evaluate whether or not this program attained its 
objectives, and ultimately put Liberia on a better path to sustainable development.  
Evaluating the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (2005-10) 
The international community had expressed interest in monitoring Liberia’s finances well before 
the Johnson-Sirleaf administration was elected into office. In 2004, the initial framework was pre-
sented to the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) on behalf of the United 
States, the World Bank, IMF, ECOWAS and the African Union. Following the exile of Charles 
Taylor and the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement in 2003, the international com-
munity saw an opportunity for economic intervention. Unfortunately, as many members of the 
transitional government had reaped illicit benefits from the civil war, domestic leadership lacked 
the political incentive to engage in such a program. Sessay et al (2009) write, “the interim govern-
ment and its chairman, Charles Gyude Bryant, were widely believed to be comprised of self-
serving individuals keen on pursuing their own ends and lacking any serious commitment to insti-
tuting positive and enduring changes in the country”(p. 46).  
 In September 2005, GEMAP was signed and later implemented by the Johnson-Sirleaf 
administration. GEMAP was intended to provide technical assistance to government institutions, 
monitor official government expenses, and assist in budgetary decision-making. The most im-
portant and controversial feature of GEMAP pertained to its co-signing authority in key govern-
ment institutions. As a result, policies enacted by Liberia’s Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Lands, Mining and Energy, and Budget Bureau were all subject to GEMAP approval.  
4For a short video on GEMAP, please visit www.gemap-liberia.org.  
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For example, the IMF placed a key administrator in Liberia’s Central Bank, while the Economic 
Governance Steering Committee was overseen by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and U.S. Ambassador to 
Liberia, Donald Booth (GEMAP-Liberia, 2014). 
 The effectiveness of the GEMAP program is subject to various interpretations. Accord-
ing to Ohiorhenuan (2009), GEMAP helped boost revenue collection throughout the state. For 
example, GEMAP reforms targeted at the Forest Development Authority helped set up check-
points intended to crackdown on illegal logging. In a similar vein, GEMAP placed more empha-
sis on bolstering enforcement of the Kimberley process as a means of reducing illegal diamond 
smuggling (p.132).  According to the official GEMAP website, the program helped to double 
revenue collected at Roberts International Airport (GEMAP-Liberia, 2014). GEMAP also con-
ducted an evaluation of Liberia’s rubber plantations. One tangible result of these reforms was the 
lifting of international sanctions on Liberian diamonds in 2007 (Ohiorhenuan 2009, 132-33). 
 The African Development Bank provides a more sober estimate of GEMAP’s success in 
Liberia. In the 2013 Country Strategy Paper, the AFDB writes, “Liberia scores high on indicators 
of governance that show the availability of de jure instruments, indicating that initial steps have 
been taken to improve the legal framework for governance and accountability. But it scores very 
low on indicators measuring de facto existence of practices and institutional behavior” (AFDB, 
2013, 4). Furthermore, Liberia “received a grade of D+ in budget and financial reporting, the ex-
tent of unreported Government operations, weaknesses in internal and external auditing, effec-
tiveness of tax collection, and donor reporting”(AFDB, 2013, 4). Therefore, despite efforts un-
dertaken by Johnson-Sirleaf and GEMAP it appears that there is a real disconnect between the 
creation of reform policies and their implementation.  
Despite the challenges and shortcomings inherent to crafting a comprehensive reform 
program, it is clear that GEMAP, at the very least, bolstered the Liberian government’s interna-
tional legitimacy. Foreign investors and aid organizations want to see states tackle corruption. 
Accordingly, Liberia’s 2014 position on the IFC/ World Bank’s Doing Business index improved 
to 144th in the world, from 149th in 2013 (IFC/World Bank, 2014). While Liberia has received 
more FDI as a result, much of the investment remains targeted at the mining sector. With new 
offshore oil discoveries, it will be important to see if FDI will shift in that direction. In either 
case, Liberia continues to face considerable obstacles to sustainable development.  
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While Sierra Leone never participated in any program resembling GEMAP in size or scope, it has 
taken some initiatives to improve domestic governance. Under President Kabbah, Sierra Leone 
launched the National Good Governance and Public Service Reform Program in 1997.  Accord-
ing to Sessay et al (2009), the program “recognized local government administration as the cor-
nerstone for providing basic services to the majority of people, in order to kick start economic 
growth in rural areas and spread participatory democracy to the grassroots”(p. 60). In 2004, the 
Kabbah government established the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). However, it was large-
ly perceived as a failure since the government refused to prosecute any high-level cases. Current 
President Bai Koroma, has also promised to crack down on corruption, though ironically his 
family has been embroiled in its own scandals. Koroma’s political opposition has charged his sis-
ter with maintaining an illegal relationship with an Indian construction firm in Sierra Leone. 
Meanwhile, Koroma is attempting to distance himself from allegations that he bought a home in 
London worth over 2 million pounds. (Cham, 2012).   
 Though corruption itself is not always an impediment to economic growth, as was the 
case with the United States and East Asia’s paths to development, it seems evident that corrup-
tion has mostly hurt African economies.  Perhaps rapid industrialization in the U.S. and East Asia 
led to the growth of an independent bourgeois class capable of putting a check on corruption. 
There is also an argument to be made that corruption may have a more negative impact in weak 
states where the government cannot fully control the patronage system. Therefore, half-hearted 
attempts to improve governance may deceive international aid organizations who wish to be de-
ceived in order to justify their monetary disbursements. However, it is unlikely that toothless re-
form policies will deceive new investors who are free to take their money elsewhere.  
Future Obstacles to Growth in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
Although Liberia and Sierra Leone feature abundant natural resources, coastline access, 
ten plus years of relative peace, and rapidly growing economies, it appears unlikely that either 
state will attain middle-income status anytime in the near future. Apart from possible aid and 
commodity dependence, coupled with weak governance, there are a whole set of additional chal-
lenges to development. Rural poverty, high youth unemployment, and conflict spillover act as 
potential impediments to sustainable growth in both states. Similarly, the recent Ebola crisis in 
West Africa has put a severe strain on the region’s economy.  
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 According to World Bank figures, over 70 percent of Sierra Leone’s labor force is em-
ployed in agriculture (World Bank, 2014). The vast majority of these are subsistence rice farmers, 
and the remainder produce export crops like palm oil, coffee, and cocoa. Unfortunately, subsist-
ence farmers are vulnerable to climate change as a dry year could destroy an annual rice crop. 
Cash crop producers are not only threatened by irregular weather patterns, but also global price 
shocks. In Liberia, the country’s most profitable exports (timber, iron ore, and rubber) are largely 
foreign owned. As a result, very few Liberians actually benefit from their involvement in these 
industries. It should not come as a surprise that illegal logging and alluvial diamond smuggling are 
attractive options for rural Liberians.  
 High levels of youth unemployment pose an economic and security threat to both states. 
Sierra Leone and Liberia feature an entire generation of young people who had their education 
interrupted during the respective civil wars. As a result, many potential employees lack the skills 
required to make positive contributions in the formal economy. While some former combatants 
underwent job training as part of reintegration programs in Liberia and Sierra Leone, their chil-
dren lacked access to education during the immediate post-conflict reconstruction period. 
Though both states are currently in a relatively stable security situation, a large pool of unem-
ployed men serve as fodder for prospective militia groups.   
 Finally, conflict spillover represents another obstacle to sustainable development in Libe-
ria and Sierra Leone. Though the civil wars in both states weren’t explicitly based out of ethnic or 
tribal grievances, certain factions tended to be divided along tribal lines. Concerning the Liberian 
war, Mark Huband (2003) writes, “The purpose of the war was clearly not tribal, in that the mo-
tive behind Charles Taylor’s invasion of northern Liberia in December 1989 was not specifically 
to overthrow one tribe and replace it with another…. Yet, “Tribal loyalties did play an important 
role in determining which side individuals chose to fight for” (p. 147). Political violence in neigh-
boring Cote D’Ivoire and ethnic conflict in Guinea have the potential to spread into Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. Whether or not a hypothetical regional conflict would take on an ethnic dimension 
is purely speculative, but not out of the realm of possibility. While it is abundantly clear that any 
combination of the aforementioned obstacles to sustained development could negatively impact 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, it does not mean that either state should take a fatalistic approach to-
ward economic development.  Sound economic policies can work to offset exogenous threats to 
progress.   
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 Evaluating Liberia and Sierra Leone’s Prospects for Sustainable De-
velopment 
Despite the massive amounts of aid money that have flowed into Sub-Saharan Africa 
over the past 30 years, it seems evident that aid by itself cannot create economic development for 
African states. Rather, a persistent lack political will and deeply embedded neo-patrimonial gov-
ernance systems often negate the potential benefits aid confers on an impoverished state. While 
smart aid strategies are preferable, when aid dispersion is contingent upon governments hitting 
certain performance benchmarks, there is little incentive or just cause for the aid community to 
abandon poor people who happen to live in a corrupt state. Therefore, Sierra Leone will continue 
to receive aid money despite its deplorable ranking on Transparency International’s corruption 
index. However, annual aid receipts will not put Sierra Leone on a path toward sustainable devel-
opment. Rather, aid in Sierra Leone may act to reinforce bad governance, and eventually lead to 
the political disintegration of the current regime.  
In contrast, the Liberian government’s decision to take tangible steps toward curbing cor-
ruption immediately places them one step ahead of Sierra Leone. In the eyes of the business 
community, Liberia appears to be a better investment. However, it would be a mistake to suggest 
that improved governance alone will lead to more economic development.  As Collier’s (2007) 
research indicates, “in the presence of large surpluses from natural resources, autocracies outper-
form democracies, and the effects are large” (p. 43).  Therefore, if one is to acknowledge that 
transparent democratic governance is a worthy pursuit, it needs to also be accompanied by a 
commitment to economic diversification.  
The Liberian government’s 2012 “Agenda for Transformation” country strategy paper 
demonstrates a commitment toward both infrastructure and human development (Government 
of Liberia, 2012). Unfortunately, as both of these ambitious initiatives demand massive invest-
ment, the Liberian government will need to be selective in allocating resources. Currently, poor 
physical infrastructure is placing a significant strain on economic activity, especially outside of 
Monrovia. According to the African Development Bank (2013), “55% of the population cannot 
access an all-season road within 5 kilometers, and 27% cannot reach one within 30 kilome-
ters” (p. 9). Bad infrastructure has a negative impact on both local and national economic activity, 
making the cost of doing business prohibitively high.  
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At the heart of Liberia’s development struggles isn’t a lack of natural resources or access 
to foreign aid. Rather, weak institutional capacity have caused a ripple effect throughout the en-
tire economy. An inefficient civil service sector needs to be reformed. The African Development 
Bank (2013) writes, “The necessity of enacting extensive legislative reforms while facilitating in-
stitutional effectiveness and building rule-of-law society is overwhelming the available institution-
al capacity” (p.10). Therefore, despite the current government’s commitment to governance re-
form and economic development, the successful implementation of new policies is hampered by 
poorly trained bureaucrats bogged down by a myriad of new reform policies. 
Finally, human capital constraints have slowed Liberia’s progress toward economic diver-
sification. Low school enrollment, coupled with poor access to credit, limits opportunities for 
domestic private sector development. Therefore, much of the service sector is dominated by for-
eign companies that import their own skilled labor. Unfortunately, an undiversified economy acts 
as self-reinforcing phenomenon; expansion in already profitable sectors creates few incentives for 
workers to develop new skills elsewhere. Microcredit and government-sponsored job-training 
programs have important roles to play in Liberia’s future development.  
While Sierra Leone faces many of the same human capital, infrastructure, and institutional 
restraints, its path to sustainable development is also constrained by a disproportionate number 
of subsistence farmers. Although the government of Sierra Leone has acknowledged this issue 
and embraced its lot as an agricultural economy, more needs to be done to ensure that its rural 
population attain a higher quality of life. The 2009 World Bank “Poverty Reduction Strategy Pa-
per” recommends that Sierra Leone “encourage greater private sector participation in the provi-
sion of agricultural inputs and equipment as well as extension services” (p.7). Additionally, the 
World Bank recommends crop diversification, to reduce rural farmers’ dependence on rice. As 
government capacity in Sierra Leone remains low, one international investment group has at-
tempted to fill the void. Addax &Oryx Group, a risk-capital group based in Sweden has been de-
veloping Sierra Leone’s bioenergy sector since 2011. According to the official website, Addax and 
Oryx offers unskilled workers “more than twice the average minimum salary” along with job-
training.  Since 2010, Addax has helped to inject $128.95 million into Sierra Leone’s economy 
(Addax, 2015). While more initiatives of this nature are needed, Sierra Leone has struggled to at-
tract FDI outside of its highly profitable mining sector. As with Liberia, rural engagement will 
need to be a critical feature of Sierra Leone’s future development activity. 
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The World Bank has also recommended government decentralization as important com-
ponent of economic development in Sierra Leone. Regional imbalances, specifically between the 
capital and the rural interior have created wide disparities in service economy access. According 
to the World Bank’s Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy paper (2009), “Staffs recommend 
that the regulatory framework be further strengthened to ensure effective devolution from the 
central to the local government particular on human resource management” (p.10).  Ideally, de-
centralization would distribute more resources to traditionally neglected regions. Yet, there are 
also costs associated with decentralizing an already weakened state. While the national govern-
ment may lack the ability to effectively distribute resources, it remains unclear whether regional 
authorities are better able to deliver services. Additionally, given Sierra Leone’s reputation for 
corrupt governance, it is plausible that decentralization would simply re-enforce traditional tribal 
or ethnic patronage systems. Therefore, it appears that state-building and decentralization may be 
at odds with one another, especially in post-conflict states where state devolution could re-ignite 
old patterns of regional competition. 
Conclusions 
Though the obstacles to sustainable development in Liberia and Sierra Leone are formi-
dable, these states also feature great untapped potential with coastline access, bountiful natural 
resources, and a growing labor force. As the overall tenor of this paper has been one of skepti-
cism, it is fitting to conclude with a dose of cautious optimism.  
 Strong post-war GDP growth coupled with HIPC debt forgiveness has allowed 
both states to commit more resources toward rebuilding human and social capital. While ensur-
ing equitable distribution of state income has been hampered by corruption and poor institutional 
capacity, Liberia has taken steps to improve governance. Liberia’s participation in GEMAP sent a 
strong message to the international community that it was ready to manage resources in a more 
responsible manner. For Sierra Leone, political rhetoric has not translated into meaningful action.  
Despite strong FDI in the country’s mining sector, most international investors have shied away 
from Sierra Leone. This is evident in the latest data, as FDI inflow for Liberia in 2013 was $1.4 
billion compared to $740 million in Sierra Leone (heritage.org, 2014). In this respect, Liberia has 
put itself on a better track to sustainable development than its neighbor.  
 Both states understand the need to diversify their commodity-dependent econo-
mies.  Liberia has done a better job with respect to developing its services sector, while Sierra Le-
one has placed emphasis on modernizing its agricultural economy.  
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However, as much of Liberia’s service sector is subsidized by aid money, the sustainability of fu-
ture growth, especially outside of Monrovia, remains unclear. Whether recent oil discoveries in 
both states provide an opportunity for economic diversification or further commodity depend-
ence also remains an open question.  
Finally, Liberia under the leadership of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has embraced a reform 
agenda. Yet, there are questions regarding the durability of her political agenda when her second 
six-year term ends in 2017. Will the next Liberian administration continue to pursue difficult re-
forms, or be tempted to extract rent from an expanding economy? In Sierra Leone, Ernest Bai 
Koroma’s 2012 electoral victory was meant to usher in an era of government transparency. In-
stead, the President has behaved a lot like his predecessor, Ahmad Kabbah. Sierra Leone’s next 
presidential election is scheduled for 2017, and it will be important to see whether the next presi-
dent institutes meaningful reform, or participates in the same system of corruption deeply em-
bedded in Sierra Leone’s political tradition.  
 Liberia and Sierra Leone have appeared to escape from the conflict trap that con-
tinues to plague much of Sub-Saharan Africa. In this respect, both states now have the oppor-
tunity to engage in sustainable development. Yet, in the critical area of human development, Li-
beria and Sierra Leone rank behind Sub-Saharan Africa as two of the poorer states in the world. 
Sustainable development will require domestic political competence, international cooperation, 
and favorable luck. Though Liberia is far from attaining global middle-income status, it is in a 
better position relative to Sierra Leone with regard to the first two attributes. However, until Li-
beria effectively combats catastrophically high levels of poverty, recent macroeconomic gains can 
be easily sabotaged.   
 Finally, as a natural experiment in post-civil war economic development, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone serve as a reference point for scholars who aim to better understand the corre-
lation between economic growth and conflict. While a preponderance of evidence indicates that 
wealthy, and even middle-income states don’t fight civil wars, more research must be conducted 
to demonstrate the durability of this relationship. More specifically, scholars must attend to the 
question of how post-conflict states can improve their economic circumstances.  In order to 
avoid the pitfalls of economic determinism, it is important to emphasize that a wide variety of 
material and ideational factors likely explain how post-conflict states overcome legacies of vio-
lence. However, it is also important for academics and policymakers to identify a handful of risk 
factors inherent to post-conflict relapse. Future comparative research in this area should yield 
promising results. 
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